This paper provides a review of the extensive contributions made to the audit pricing 
acquire data through survey methods, or by direct approach to the accounting firms themselves. Both these methods have proved unreliable in terms of data supply on an ongoing basis, and thus constrained US research output in this area.
The post-Enron disclosure regime in the US now provides for similar audit fee disclosure to that mandated in AASB 101. 1 Since the Australian audit fee data source advantage has now disappeared, this appears to be a useful occasion to review the existing Australian audit pricing evidence, and to suggest some possible future The review is structured as follows: In the Section 2, the origins of the audit pricing model and the theory of audit quality are discussed. Section 3 includes a review of the 'early' Australian literature focussed on product differentiation and pricing premiums for large audit firms. Section 4 examines pricing premiums for the industry specialist auditors. Section 5 extends discussion in Section 4 and overviews recent literature on industry specialist premiums at the local office level. Finally in Sections 6.1 -6.3 some possible future research directions are briefly discussed.
1 It is noted that AASB 101, consistent with provisions in the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program [hereafter CLERP] Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act 24 th June 2004, requires enhanced disclosure of monetary payments to auditors for differing types of non-audit services such as tax, consulting, IT, audit related, and accounting and due diligence. This is significant since the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) Section 201 effectively prohibits an auditor from performing all other types of non-audit services apart from tax in the US. Thus, the allowance of the auditor to (i) perform, and for the client to (ii) disclose differing types of non-audit services in Australia maintains an interesting non-audit fee advantage for Australian researchers. Implications of this enhanced disclosure are discussed further in the Section 6.2 'Auditor Independence' where possible future research directions are discussed. Simunic (1980) provides the theoretical underpinning for the most often applied audit fee model used in economics of auditing research. For the auditee, Simunic suggests that an audit functions as a type of insurance, the benefits of which arise from liability avoidance to financial statement users (shareholders, creditors) in the event of litigation. This theoretical approach also explains the relative demand for internal versus external auditing. Simunic argues that a substitution effect occurs between internal and external auditing, dependent on the relative strength of the client's internal controls.
Origins of the audit pricing model
From the supply perspective, the key determinants of audit prices are those factors deemed to contribute to an auditors' potential loss exposure arising from such litigation. To identify these drivers of potential auditor loss exposure, Simunic (1980) adopted an inductive research approach. Discussions were held with representatives of large audit firms, and also providers of professional liability insurance.
2 From these discussions, a number of factors were identified as supply side determinants of loss exposure. These included (a) the size of the auditee, (b) the complexity of the auditee's operations, (c) the risk of the auditee's operations, and (d) the industry of the auditee. The empirical proxies developed by Simunic for each determinant form the basis of the audit fee model, applied in the majority of subsequent audit pricing studies both in Australian and abroad.
Whilst Simunic (1980) is credited with the theoretical development of the audit fee model, the paper also makes major empirical contributions. A key empirical issue addressed in the study is whether assumptions of price competition in the audit 2 Throughout this paper, the term large auditors merely refers to any combination of Big 8, Big 6 or Big 5 auditors, whilst the term small auditors refers to the non-Big 8, non-Big 6 or non-Big 5 auditors respectively. market are valid following the merger activity that saw the formation of the Big 8. 3 To examine this issue, Simunic partitions the sample based on client size, with the assumption of price competition in the market for small audits providing a benchmark for comparison with the increasingly concentrated market for larger client audits. The results indicate no significant differences in the auditor type (large versus small) coefficients across the two sub-samples, indicating the assumption of price competition throughout the market cannot be rejected. In addition, negative co-efficients on the large audit firm indicator variable across the full sample is argued to be a function of economies of scale benefits to larger auditors. This is suggestive of larger auditors charging lower fees, although this finding has not been replicated in subsequent audit pricing studies. Structural issues raised in Simunic (1980) would influence later audit pricing research in Australia.
The other key theory contribution impacting subsequent Australian audit pricing studies was DeAngelo (1981) . 4 DeAngelo developed the theoretical basis for the existence of audit quality, and its relationship with auditor size. DeAngelo defined audit quality as:
(a) the probability that an auditor will discover a breach in the client's accounting system, and (b) the probability that this breach will be reported. switching costs (principally search costs) incurred when changing auditors. As a result of the existence of these 'joint costs', a bilateral monopoly exists, and the larger the auditors' client base, the larger the quasi rents at stake should the auditor produce a poor quality audit. The auditor quality -size relationship posited by DeAngelo, and competition issues raised in Simunic (1980) would motivate much of the subsequent Australian audit pricing research.
Early Australian research: Product differentiation and pricing premiums for large audit firms
Following Simunic (1980) and DeAngelo (1981) , the early research literature using Australian data namely Francis (1984) , and Francis and Stokes (1986) sought to examine whether product differentiation might be a factor in audit pricing. Francis (1984) develops theoretical arguments for client demand for higher quality audits based on agency theory. The agency theory argument suggests that shareholders impose tighter monitoring on those managers who are viewed as being more opportunistic, or on firms that suffer from higher perceived or real agency costs. If tighter monitoring is demanded by shareholders, one solution would be to choose a higher quality auditor. Francis (1984) argues that if audit quality is not homogeneous, the implicit assumption of collusive behaviour where concentration of audit firms is high is incorrect. The reason is smaller auditors might choose not to invest to build the necessary reputation to service larger clients. This will account for the high concentration of audit firms in the large client market segment, rather than smaller auditors being 'forced out'. In addition, since large auditors supply higher quality audits, they will also supply higher priced audits, given differentiated demand and a competitive market. These assertions form the basis of the empirical tests undertaken.
Francis ( This is interpreted as evidence of product differentiation to the Big 8 in the small client market. In the large client segment, the failure to identify Big 8 premiums is interpreted as the co-existence of Big 8 product differentiation, along with diseconomies of scale to the non-Big 8 for large client audits. The diseconomies are argued to force up prices of the small auditors, offsetting product differentiation premiums to the large auditors, resulting in no observed Big 8 premium.
Pricing premiums for industry specialist auditors
One of the most widely cited papers in the audit pricing literature is Craswell, Francis and Taylor (1995) [hereafter CFT]. CFT examine Simunic (1980) 's assertions that the pricing of audits may differ according to the industry of the auditee. CFT suggest that company and industry specific factors result in cross sectional differences in monitoring demand, including demand for industry specialists. CFT argue that the supply of higher quality auditors in the form of industry specialists is merely a response to clients who demand higher quality monitoring as a function of their increased agency costs. Thus the demand for quality-differentiated audits -both brand name audits and industry specialist audits -is grounded in agency theory (CFT, p.
299). This differential demand for auditing leads auditors to undertake investments enabling the supply of differentiated audit quality in the form of Big 8/non-Big 8 differentiation, and within Big 8 differentiation through industry specialization.
If Big 8 auditors make these investments, they will require a normal rate of return on those investments (CFT, p. 301). This should be reflected in higher fees for large compared to small auditors and higher fees for specialist large auditors On top of a brand name premium, CFT find a 34% premium to auditor industry specialists. CFT's findings raise two interesting issues in terms of their interpretation and generalisability. First, an important point to note is that specialists were defined as those auditors holding a 10% market share of either clients or fees in 'specialist' industries. However, the presence of the fee premium at the 10% share is not replicated for a tighter definition of specialist at the 20% level. CFT suggest some caution in interpreting their result, as it may be a product of a data artefact. It also raises the issue of whether the presence of economies of scale 'kick-in' at somewhere between the 10% and 20% market share level, mitigating any product differentiation premiums at the higher market share threshold.
A second issue is the location of the observed premium. The premium in CFT is found for clients in 'specialist' industries; with specialist industries defined using following the two rounds of merger activity after CFT? Do industry specialist premiums persist after the same two rounds of merger activity? To test these issues using a more recent sample, audit fee and other necessary data from hardcopy annual reports and other sources for the years 1990, 1992, 1994, 1998 were acquired. The brand name and specialist hypotheses are re-examined using similar market share based definitions of specialization as CFT. Additional market share sensitivities are also tested in light of the merger activity, and associated concentration effects.
The results documented in FS indicate that the general brand name distinction between large and small auditors is present. Second, consistent with the prior CFT findings, when tests of specialist premiums at various levels of market share are undertaken, they produce only mixed results. For example, FS tests of specialist premiums using either fees or clients at the 10% and 20% cut-offs, are observed in only two out of four years. As a final test, the logic of the auditor quality/industry specialist argument is extended through tests for the existence of premiums paid to auditor industry leaders. Industry leadership is arguably more unequivocal and unambiguous signal of reputation than tests based on the arbitrary market share categories first adopted in CFT. 6 Results of the tests of industry leadership identify a change in the strength of the audit industry leader co-efficients over time. In earlier years (1990 -1992) , evidence of audit industry leader premiums is reported.
However, by 1994, this premium has weakened to the extent that when tests are run in specialist industries, no evidence of leader premiums is found. By 1998, no evidence of leader premiums is present in either tests within specialist industries or in tests across all industries. However, the extent to which the weakening of leadership premiums may be due to economies of scale benefits is hard to determine. (2003) [hereafter FFS (2003)].
Industry specialist premiums at the local office level
FFS (2003) auditor expertise is valued by audit clients. In addition, they find evidence that overall city-specific market leadership also matters in fee determination, although at weaker significance levels. Their results highlight the importance of both city-specific industry leadership, and city-specific overall leadership in differentiating auditors.
Possible research directions
This review has focussed on the significant contribution made by audit pricing studies based on Australian audit fee data over the last two decades. This period corresponds with the competitive advantage in the form of audit fee data availability
Australian researchers have enjoyed vis-a-vis those in the US. A 'level playing field' with regard to audit fee disclosure raises the question of the likely direction of future Australian enquiry. Fortunately the dynamic state of market structure, coupled with regulatory interest in accounting firms point to continuing opportunities. Whilst current US studies are likely to be directed at least in part by issues raised in the prior Australian empirical research, there will be an ongoing role for Australian research effort in replication of US audit pricing studies. The international interest in such replication style papers will rest on the importance to the literature of out of US sample evidence. In addition to replications, the following areas come to mind as possible future research areas and constitute by no means an exhaustive list.
Consolidation issues
Regulatory concerns about heightened concentration in the market for audit services represents something of an 'old chestnut', and arguably first motivated Simunic benefit from data outside the US
Auditor independence
Independence concerns arising from joint supply of audit and non-audit services have been heightened by recent corporate collapses. Early Australian evidence on this issue is provided by Barkess and Simnett (1994) who also examine the determinants of non-audit service fees. Barkess and Simnett identify no relationship between audit qualifications and non-audit service fees. Wines (1994) also examines auditor supply of non-audit services and propensity to modify audit opinions, and finds that auditors sourcing more non-audit services from clients are more likely to provide a clean opinion. More recently Craswell (1999) In terms of further effort in this area, researchers might consider that recent audit firm restructuring has seen consulting divisions spun-off, which arguably resolves some of the perceived independence threat. Consequently, research effort on non-audit services using Australian data will most likely evolve more along the lines of recent US literature such as Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy and Raghunandan (2003) . This study examines whether audit and non-audit services fees are simultaneously determined. This approach has not been replicated in Australia, and
given the non-audit services sensitivity results reported in FS, joint determination represents an attractive research question to be applied to Australian data.
As observed in Footnote 1, research questions involving non-audit services will also be encouraged by enhanced non-audit fee disclosure emanating from the whilst the US now has comparable audit fee disclosure to Australia, we maintain a disclosure advantage in terms of non-audit fees.
Measurement Issues
A final suggestion relates to the potential for improvements in the audit quality proxies adopted in audit pricing studies. Gramling and Stone (2001) contains a useful summary including discussion of problems relating to measurement of industry expertise. Gramling and Stone list the three methods typically adopted in the literature including: (1) industry market share as a proxy for industry expertise, (2) percentage of an audit firm's revenue in an industry relative to total revenue across all industries and (3) specialist measures based on self proclaimed industry specialization on accounting firm web-sites. Each of these measures of industry specialisation has potentially serious problems. For example, using audit fees to construct market share metrics to define specialisation or industry leadership creates a potential endogeneity problem, since the dependent variable is a log of audit fees. This highlights a more general problem faced by researchers in the economics of auditing field which is the development of valid measures of the audit quality construct.
One approach might be to make use of capital market assessments to validate existing audit quality measures. An example using Australian data is Ferguson and Matolcsy (2004) , who examine audit quality measures in a post-earnings announcement drift context. 14 Ferguson and Matolcsy examine large versus small audit firm, industry specialist, and auditor industry leader dummies -the same audit quality metrics applied in FS. Interestingly, Ferguson and Matolcsy find differing capital market reaction when partitions are undertaken within the Big 6/5 auditors themselves. This result is not unsurprising given FS report that the industry specialist 14 Another recent example of applying audit quality metrics in a capital market setting is StevensonClarke and Hodgson (2004) who examine Audit Quality and both earnings and cash response coefficients. They find that the use of a Big 5 auditor enhances the perceived credibility of reported earnings for industrial companies, but not mining firms.
premium disappeared when KPMG was excluded from the sample, implying that specialist premiums were impacted by individual auditor brand name effects.
Two points emerge from Ferguson and Matolcsy (2004) . First, it is likely that audit pricing research will be increasingly directed at identifying differences within the Big 4 as opposed to simple comparisons of large and small auditors. Second, novel ways of validating and assessing audit quality metrics are likely to be of interest to the both practitioners and researchers alike.
